A Resilient Cybersecurity Framework for Mobile Financial Services (MFS) by Ambore, S. et al.
A Resilient Cybersecurity Framework for Mobile 
Financial Services (MFS) 
 
Stephen Ambore,Christopher Richardson, Huseyin Dogan, Edward Apeh, David Osselton 
Cybersecurity Unit, Bournemouth University, 
Dorset, UK 
{S. Ambore, C.J. Richardson, H. Dogan, E. Apeh, D. Osselton}@bournemouth.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract—Cybercrime has astronomically risen with 
technological advancements alongside the business opportunities 
in cyberspace. So much so that cybercrime is now viewed as one 
of the top ten global risks. In recognition of the threat posed by 
cybercrime, organisations are investing in controls and 
countermeasures that would combat the threat of cybercrime and 
its impact. However, incidences of successful cyber-attacks are 
still on the rise. The advent of mobile devices has created a means 
of providing financial services to over 2 billion people globally 
that hitherto had no access to formal banking services. Also, 
banks and other financial institutions use mobile platforms as an 
alternative delivery channel for financial services. However, the 
dark side of using mobile devices to bridge the banking gap is 
that mobile devices are now an added vector for cybersecurity 
threats. This has affected trust in the use of the system and 
consequently slowed down the uptake of Mobile Financial 
Services (MFS).  This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the 
opportunities mobile platforms provide for the unbanked and 
how cybersecurity is hampering the uptake of MFS. 
Furthermore, the paper proposes an approach for mitigating 
cybercrime in the complex MFS ecosystem, and presents 
preliminary results from the research conducted so far. 
Keywords—cybersecurity; Mobile Financial Services; human 
factors; countermeasures; framework 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 Projected to reach an estimated cost of about $2.1 trillion 
by 2019, on fraud related to data breaches alone [1], 
cybercrime is not abating. Recent events have shown how 
pervasive and disruptive cybercrime has become. 
Repetitiveness and frequency of cybercrime is also on the rise. 
For instance, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT), an interbank message carrier, 
recently reported attacks on 3 banks. This is in addition to 
recent attacks on SWIFT bank customers in Vietnam, Ecuador 
and Bangladesh [2].  
 The main motivation for cybercrime is financial gains [17]. 
Attackers use malware to obtain money from customer bank 
accounts. Ransomewares have also been deployed to extort 
money from their victims. Other motivations for cybercrime 
may include sabotage or curiosity. Cyber-attacks can also 
occur due to insider abuse. For instance, a staff of an 
organisation can fraudulently obtain elevated privileges on 
systems if the right controls are not put in place. These 
privileges may be used to commit fraudulent acts. Insider abuse 
may also occur as a result of genuine mistakes or lack of 
knowledge.  
While some organisations have invested in implementing 
technological controls to mitigate the risks posed by 
cybercrime, others have invested in more comprehensive 
information security programs for the same purpose. These 
efforts notwithstanding, news of successful cyber-attacks on 
organisations are still frequently in the news. 
 The top cybersecurity threats for 2015 according to 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) [18] include: 
• Malware; 
• Web based attacks; 
• Web application attacks; 
• Botnets; 
• Denial of service; 
• Physical damage/theft/loss; and  
• Insider abuse. 
Worthy of note is the role of the human element in these 
attacks. None of the attacks can be successfully executed 
without the participation of the human element, either as the 
originator, the medium or the actual executor of the attack. 
Therefore, any effective countermeasure must be very robust 
enough to address the risk(s) posed by the human element in 
the perpetuation of cybercrime. 
With the introduction of new technologies like mobile 
devices, more people are becoming connected to the 
cyberspace and the risks of cybercrime is becoming more 
widespread. This has been made worse by poor mobile device 
users’ security practices. The expectation on end-users to be 
ultimately responsible for the security of their mobile devices 
has made the mobile device a likely attack vector. 
While most organisations can acquire the skills and have 
the financial capability to put some controls in place, end-user 
technologies like mobile devices depends very much on the 
user’s awareness of cybersecurity and technology as a key 
control. This further buttresses the need to consider the unique 
characteristics of the human element in coming up with an 
effective cybersecurity solution for MFS. 
Strong technical infrastructure base for secure electronic 
financial transactions exists. For instance, strong encryption, 
multiple levels of authentication using biometric, 
steganography and a combination of biometry based 
authentication and tokenization have been implemented [3,4,5].  
Furthermore, standards and frameworks for mitigating the 
risk of cybercrime and to serve as guidelines for the 
appropriate use of the technical security solutions have been 
published. For instance, a guideline for mobile platform 
applications developers and merchants [6], meant to serve as a 
control for cybercrime, was published by the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), a proprietary 
information security standard organisation for the card 
payment industry.  
The US based National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has over 900 publications addressing 
various aspects of cybersecurity [19]. Furthermore, in 
recognition of the impact of cybersecurity to national security, 
countries like the UK have established a cybersecurity centre, 
to facilitate intelligence sharing [32]. 
In spite of the existence of these countermeasures, the 
threat of cybercrime is not abating. The 2016 Global Risk 
report, an annual report published by the World Economic 
Forum has identified data fraud as 1 of top 10 likely global 
risks of 2016 [7]. 
Over 2 billion people in the world currently do not have 
access to formal banking services [8]. This group comprises of 
the “Unbanked” and the “Under-banked”. While the unbanked 
do not have access at all, the under-banked do not have 
sufficient access. We will refer to both groups as the unbanked 
in the rest of this paper.  
Advancement in mobile technologies had made mobile 
platforms and their devices accessible to over 7 billion people 
worldwide, reaching a global penetration rate of 97% [9]. In 
order to take advantage of the opportunities provided by 
mobile platforms, companies have developed various financial 
products to serve the unbanked. For instance, Mobile Money is 
a mobile device based technological innovation that has been 
used as a channel to provide financial services to the unbanked 
and to overcome barriers to financial inclusion. Since debuting 
in Kenya in 2007, the Mobile Money company M-PESA now 
has over 40 million customers. 20 million of these customers 
recorded over $500 million in funds transfers alone in a certain 
month [14].    
The unbanked are not the only benefactors of the 
advancement in mobile technologies and platforms. Mobile 
platform based financial products now exit that serve other 
segments of the world population. For instance, MFS has 
gained prominence as a replacement for cash purchases and as 
a countermeasure against credit card fraud through the 
implementation of mobile wallets [10]. Since Starbucks; an 
American coffee company lunched a mobile payment 
application in 2011 for its American customers, acceptance of 
MFS has grown largely due to its convenience and value add 
services [20].  
Also, given the opportunity presented for cutting down cost 
and increasing operational efficiency, banks now use mobile 
devices as an alternative banking delivery channel to its 
customers [11]. Mobile banking is now a hygiene factor for the 
technology savvy banking population and other customers who 
prefer to bank anywhere at their own convenience. 
Furthermore, access to insurance products is available via 
mobile devices. 
Cybercrime is the dark side of progress of mobile device 
based financial products. With the advent of mobility, the 
paradigm of cyberspace has shifted. The high penetration rate, 
personalised and affordable nature of mobile devices mean 
more people are now connected to the cyberspace than ever 
before. Consequently, the risks inherent in the cyberspace has 
now moved closer to the door steps of a larger segment of the 
world population and has made the attainment of cybersecurity 
a moving target. A recent report showed that over 5 billion 
downloaded mobile applications are vulnerable to remote 
attacks [33]. Furthermore, over 173% increase in mobile fraud 
was recorded between 2013 and 2015. With estimated revenue 
from MFS projected to reach $516 billion by 2017, MFS is the 
new cash cow for cybercrime [34].  Therefore, along with the 
opportunities presented by MFS to provide financial services, it 
has also created a new vector for cybercrime, threatening to 
erode the gains. This has led to a lack of trust in MFS, which 
has slowed down the adoption of MFS, despite the obvious 
benefits [12]. 
The existence of strong technical security countermeasures 
for electronic transactions, framework and standards while 
providing a mechanism for mitigating against the threat of 
cybercrime, have not provided a workable solution specifically 
for MFS. In a recent global survey conducted by ISACA, 
respondents expected an 87% increase in data breach on MFS 
in the next 12 months. MFS was also adjudged the least 
preferred method of payment compared to instruments like 
payment cards and cheques [10]. 
Research has been conducted on strengthening MFS 
technical security countermeasures [3, 4 and 5], and improving 
MFS security [10]. Approaches for implementing cybersecurity 
countermeasures for complex systems have also been 
researched [13]. The solutions proffered in previous works 
advocated strengthening technical controls, and have not been 
circumspect in providing a workable solution for cybersecurity. 
Available standards tend to be generic and not specifically built 
to address the unique context of MFS. 
Furthermore, improved information security practices now 
exist. For instance, concepts like defense in depth; where 
layered security mechanisms are used to improve system 
security and security by design; where software are design 
from scratch with security in mind, have both been successfully 
implemented to improve the security posture of technological 
landscapes [35]. 
However, highly resilient countermeasures for 
cybersecurity go beyond providing technological controls and 
generic standards to putting in place measures that would 
consider the unique characteristics of the ecosystem and social 
context of the system, in this case, the complex MFS 
ecosystem. 
The MFS ecosystem is a socio-technical system because it 
involves complex social and technical interaction within 
trusted and untrusted elements, within and outside systems, 
organisational and national boundaries [36].  
Existing countermeasures work well for predefined 
environments but are not well suited for socio-technical 
interactions within a complex socio-technical system like the 
MFS Socio-Technical System (MFS STS). For instance, one of 
the controls for MFS fraud is setting a maximum limit for 
allowable transaction. While this countermeasure limits the 
impact of fraud, it also limits trusted entities within the system 
from enjoying the full benefit of MFS. Furthermore, some end-
users who are granted elevated privileges on systems in an 
organisation, also retain same privileges even when they 
attempt to logon from untrusted environments, compromising 
the countermeasures put in place. In a complex environment 
like the MFS ecosystem where information flows within 
trusted and untrusted elements, these types of controls might 
not be effective in tackling cybercrime. The ideal control for 
the complex MFS STS must be dynamic enough to address 
various information flow scenarios within the STS and 
redundant enough to compensate for failing controls. 
No known study has been conducted on developing a 
resilient cybersecurity framework for the complex MFS 
ecosystem considering its unique characteristics and social 
context with the aim of mitigating the risks of cybercrime and 
consequently boosting adoption. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the research into 
developing a resilient framework for information assurance 
aimed at providing a methodology for mitigating the risks 
posed by cybercrime to the uptake of MFS. The proposed 
framework aims to be dynamic enough to cater for the complex 
social interaction within trusted and untrusted components of 
the system and redundant enough to ensure sufficient 
compensating controls are put in place to further improve trust 
in the ecosystem. The resilient framework will break the trust 
barrier and improve adoption and usability within the MFS 
ecosystem.  
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the 
opportunities mobile platforms provide to access financial 
services, and how cybersecurity is hampering the uptake of 
MFS. It then describes the approach adopted for mitigating the 
threat posed by cybercrime to MFS.  Preliminary results and 
understanding obtained in analysing cybersecurity issues 
affecting the complex MFS ecosystem are also discussed.    
The next section presents a background overview of mobile 
financial services including a description of stakeholders and 
underpinning technology. Existing cybersecurity threats to 
MFS and current countermeasures are also discussed in Section 
II. Section III describes the approach adopted in developing the 
solution. Preliminary results of the work done to date are 
discussed in section IV. The paper concludes with a summary 
and direction for future work in Section V. 
 
II. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW OF MOBILE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 
  
To facilitate better understanding of cybersecurity issues in 
MFS, we shall provide an understanding of MFS and the 
ecosystem. 
A. MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES TAXONOMY 
 
The benefits of using Mobile devices as a means of 
carrying out financial transaction include; effectiveness, 
security and convenience of transactions by end-users, cost 
reduction and improved operational efficiency by banks and 
attainment of financial inclusion objectives by government and 
institutions amongst others. What is lacking is a generally 
accepted taxonomy for describing mobile devices based 
financial products. Terms like Mobile Wallets, Mobile Money, 
and Mobile Payment have been used interchangeably to 
describe the same products [14, 15, and 16].  
 Mobile Banking stands out in this regards, as it has been 
generally accepted as an alternative channel of delivery for 
banking services. Furthermore, the advent of Financial 
Technology (Fintech) 2.0 [1] has thrown products like Mobile 
Insurance into the fray. With the exception of insurance 
products, all other products can be used for payments. 
 Mobile Money users do not require a bank account. Mobile 
Payment as part of Mobile Wallets requires users to own credit 
cards.  The scope of this research covers Mobile Wallets, 
Mobile Money and Mobile Banking. We henceforth refer to 
them broadly as MFS. We further describe these 3 MFS 
products. 
(i) Mobile Wallets: One important innovation of e-
commerce was the e-wallet. E-wallets enable 
customers to store monetary value online, which they 
could use to make payments for procurements done 
from merchants who accept them. Examples of 
popular e-wallet services include google wallet and 
Paypal. The advent of mobile devices led to the 
implementation on a Mobile device based e-wallets. 
Mobile wallets sometimes referred to as M-wallets 
provide the same kind of services offered previously 
by e-wallets. M-wallets have the added capability of 
mobility that enables proximity payments. Examples 
of mobile wallets include Apple pay, Samsung pay 
and Android pay. Near Field Communication (NFC), 
a contactless communication technology is the 
underpinning technology used by mobile wallets for 
proximity payments. Biometric authentication 
capability of smart phones provides an added layer of 
security for mobile wallet based payments products. 
 
(ii) Mobile Money: Cash is still the preferred means of 
payments in most developing countries. Cash 
transactions however are fraught with many risks 
which include theft and loss. Availability of banking 
services is also a major concern. Mobile money 
provides banking services that replaces the use of 
cash with “electronic” money. Mobile Money agents 
act on behalf of banks to collect cash from their 
customers in exchange for e-float. Customers can 
perform a person-to-person money transfer or 
payments of goods without the need for physical 
cash. Cash-in and cash-out operations can also be 
conducted with the agents. Mobile money 
implementation is more predominant in developing 
countries. The predominant technologies used in 
Mobile Money are Unstructured Supplementary 
Service Data (USSD) and Short Message Services 
(SMS). These are cellular communication 
technologies that are used to send messages between 
end-user phones and applications programs in 
communication networks. Lack of end-to-end 
encryption for both technologies however, makes 
them vulnerable to attacks [21]. 
 
(iii) Mobile Banking: Mobile Banking is an extension of 
banking services provided by banks through mobile 
platforms. Customers remotely connect to their bank 
via mobile applications to conduct normal banking 
operations. Customers can also access the bank by 
connecting to a secure bank Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL), popularly referred to as web address 
via mobile platform browsers. 
 
 Fig 1 shows the taxonomy of MFS. 
 
B. TECHNOLOGY UNDERPINING MFS 
 
To further provide an understanding of how mobile 
platforms are used to provide financial services, we analysed 
the basic technologies underpinning mobile platforms, their 
characteristics and impact on the uptake of MFS 
The end-user tool used to access MFS products is the 
mobile phone. Mobile phones are of 2 types; Smartphones and 
feature phones (non-smart phones). While both phone types 
can be used to access MFS, the capability of the phones either 
enables or restricts certain services. For instance, the graphic 
user interface of smartphones and its underlying Operating 
System (OS) can facilitate contactless payment using the 
biometric capability for authentication, in addition to token and 
personal identification number (PIN). Feature phones largely 
depend on USSD and SMS for payment operations. Regardless 
of the phone types, mobile phones can only establish 
connection through two primary means; the internet or Mobile 
Network Operator (MNO) access.  
The phone features and means of connection to financial 
services have implications on security. For instance, biometric 
authentication in combination with tokens and PINs has 
provided an improved level of security for payments using 
smartphones. On the other hand, vulnerabilities in USSD and 
the lack of end-to-end encryption on SMS coupled with the 
basic nature of feature phones make them more prone to cyber-
attacks. The use of public WI-FI to provide internet connection 
for mobile platforms makes it vulnerable to mobile malware 
attacks. 
A typical MFS transaction using the mobile platform 
traverses through various stakeholders and technologies before 
it is consummated. For instance, a mobile payment request 
goes through the internet or MNO to the wallet manager, then 
to the card issues, then to the payment network, and then 
finally to the merchant via a contactless operation using the 
NFC technology. Each service provider in the value chain has 
its own technologies and processes. Some of these transactions 
traverse organizational and geographic boundaries.  
Hence, the MFS ecosystem is a complex one. These types 
of systems are Socio-Technical Systems (STS). They are a 
combination of social and technical interaction to achieve a 
certain objective [31]. 
 An understanding of the technological base that underpins 
mobile platforms and their characteristics together with an 
understanding of the complex ecosystem in which MFS 
operates provides a better insight to the cybersecurity threats 
facing MFS and how to mitigate them. The next section further 
describes the complex MFS ecosystem. 
 
C. THE COMPLEX MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS (STS) 
Initial investigations in [36] revealed that the MFS STS 
consist of the end-user who uses mobile device to access 
financial services. While the banked use mobile to access MFS 
services directly by connecting remotely using their mobile 
devices, the unbanked depend on agents who act in capacity of 
banks. Service providers also exist to provide direct and in 
direct services in the MFS STS. The periphery of the complex 
MFS STS spans beyond institutional and nations.  
 The major influencers in the STS are the service providers, 
who provide services either directly to the end-users or as 
secondary service providers to other service providers within 
the STS.  
 The path of information flow in the STS is not clear thereby 
raising concerns about data privacy.  The coordination in the 
STS is not central as several regulators responsible for different 
aspects exist within the STS. Stakeholder analysis conducted 
revealed the following stakeholders: 
(iv) End-User: This can be the initiator or beneficiary of a 
financial service initiated by the use of mobile 
devices. 
(v) Mobile Network Operator (MNO): The MNO 
provides a means of connectivity; in some instances, 
it participates in providing MFS. 
(vi) Mobile Money Operators (MMO): These are agents 
that act on behalf of the bank to provide banking 
services via mobile devices to end-user. They also  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mobile Financial Services Taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mobile Financial Services (MFS) 
Mobile Wallet  
Mobile Money  
Mobile Banking  
Technology: NFC, Biometric, 
Tokenization 
Technology: USSD, SMS 
Technology: Web protocols, 
Tokens 
MP*: e.g. Apple Pay, Samsung pay  
Predominant user: Banked 
MP*: MPESA, PAGA etc. 
Predominant Users: Unbanked 
Predominant user: Banked 
Payment card holders 
Bank account holders 
Mobile Phone based Fintech 
Products 
Mobile Insurance 
Countermeasures: Standards, 
authentication and transaction limits 
Countermeasure: User Awareness 
Countermeasure: same as those for 
mobile wallet and online banking 
perform cash-in and cash-out operations. They 
operate in the value chain for Mobile Money only. 
(vii) Deposit Money Banks (DMB):  Banks provide 
settlement services to MMOs; they and banking 
services delivery channel through Mobile Banking. 
(viii) Merchants: They provide terminals for Mobile 
Payments. 
(ix) Card Issuers: They issue cards that are coded in 
smartphones and used for Mobile Payments. 
(x) Regulators: Include; financial services and 
telecommunications regulators. They regulate the 
activities in the ecosystem. 
(xi) Service Providers: These include mobile applications 
developers, phone manufacturers, utility services 
providers and all third party stakeholders that provide 
services to enhance MFS. 
(xii) Law Enforcement and Security Agency: These are 
not direct stakeholders but require information from 
the STS to enable a secure wider ecosystem. 
 
Understanding the role of each stakeholder and the mode of 
interaction between components within the STS is important in 
understanding the issues impacting cybersecurity in complex 
MFS. The findings obtained in examining the STS are 
presented in Section IV of this paper. 
D. CYBERSECURITY IN MFS STS AND 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
   While, loss/theft of mobile devices, misconfiguration of 
mobile applications and mobile malwares are the better known 
cybersecurity threats with mobile applications [18]. There are 
vulnerabilities inherent in the technologies and processes that 
drive the use of the product. 
 
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the MFS can generally be 
classified into the follow: 
(i) End-User Device Technology: The primary tool to 
access MFS is the mobile phone. On a basic level, the 
smartphone architecture consists of 4 areas [10] 
namely: 
a. Normal Operating System (OS) and 
Application Environment. It hosts third 
party software and generally has low 
security. 
b. Secure Elements (SE). A more secure 
hardware environment than the OS 
environment. It hosts multiple sensitive 
applications and data. 
c. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). A 
secure area of the main processor that 
protects sensitive data and authorises 
software applications. 
d. Client Apps. A specific area for housing 
client application on the devices. 
 
Understanding of this architecture has facilitated the 
development of fairly strong technology 
countermeasure for MFS. However, this same 
knowledge has been exploited to commit fraud in the 
system. 
 
(ii) Communication Channels: Users must establish 
network communication before they can perform any 
MFS transaction. This could be through Mobile 
Network Operator (MNO) access, the internet or 
proximity payment using contactless technologies 
like NFC or Bluetooth. These technologies are 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks  
(iii) Services Provider Backend: Services providers invest 
in backend technology infrastructure including 
databases, software applications and network 
platforms. If these backend technology bases for the 
service providers are not regularly updated and 
patched it leaves a gap that could be exploited for 
cybercrime. 
(iv) Process: Human actors interact with technology 
through defined processes; these processes need to be 
optimised and robust enough to encourage 
behaviours that would mitigate the threat of 
cybercrime. 
(v) Human Element: This vulnerability relates to the 
action or inaction of the human element along the 
value chain of providing MFS.  These include 
mistakes in design of technology leaving gaps that 
could be exploited. It also involves other malicious 
acts by humans or genuine mistakes by users and 
system administrators in the MFS STS. Stringent 
security measure can also lead to end-user actions 
that could compromise security.  
 
   Technologies like biometry have been implemented in 
conjunction with tokenization to “harden” the security for 
MFS. However, end- users are expected to perform complex 
tasks to enable certain countermeasures. For instance, end-
users are expected to enable certain functions on their smart 
phones to enable remote wipe in the event of loss of phones 
[10].  
 
   Privacy of user data cannot be vouched for when using MFS 
[22]. Most service providers along the value chain wants a 
piece of user data to enable them analyse current use and 
improve future products. To mitigate the risk of data privacy, 
Apple implemented mobile device encryption and in its recent 
operation system (OS) versions, users do not have the option 
to turn it off [23]. However, this countermeasure does not 
exist in all mobile devices.  
 
   In addition, privacy agreement is still complex for an 
average end-user to comprehend [24].  The timing of updates 
and patches are inconsistent in some mobile OS because of the 
wireless carrier that controls the update schedule, making 
some of the mobile applications prone to mobile malware 
attacks [23]. 
 
   The rush to release mobile applications also makes some 
MFS applications not properly tested and vulnerable to cyber-
attacks [25]. The presence of rogue mobile applications and 
the ability of phone users to sideload; install mobile 
application from unauthorized sources, has also presented 
security challenge for MFS. Though standards exist in 
countries like the US and the UK, some countries do not have 
explicit legislation on data privacy [26]. The standards in 
some other jurisdictions have not been updated regularly. This 
poses a risk for cross border transactions using MFS. 
 
   The means of connection for MFS transaction and some 
technologies used are susceptible to cyber-attacks. Connection 
via public WI-FI can provide a window for cyber-attack [27]. 
Mobile Money still uses vulnerable technologies like USSD 
and SMS as the primary technologies to perform transactions, 
and these can be exploited for cybercrime. 
 
   In the MFS STS, several regulators exist. The overlapping 
roles they play have caused a gap in regulation in the 
ecosystem. For instance, the issues of ownership of customer 
data between the Banks and the MNO have made the 
management of privacy in the STS more challenging. The 
anonymous nature of mobile device users and the ability for 
more than one person to use a particular mobile device makes 
it difficult to ascertain the actual initiator of a financial 
transaction, except in devices where biometric authentication 
has been deployed. 
 
   When Mobile devices of  end-users that initiate a 
transactions are patched and up-to-date on security fixes, the 
threat of cybercrime would still exist in the value chain where 
any or part of the technical infrastructure of one or more of the 
service providers is not updated or patched . No authority in 
the MFS STS is responsible for providing an assurance that 
the technical infrastructure of all service providers in the STS 
is up-to-date on security fixes and patches. 
 
   Countermeasures exist to mitigate cybersecurity threat in the 
use of MFS products and in the complex MF STS. 
Technological advancement in threat monitoring and threat 
intelligence has also been implemented as controls against 
cybercrime [18]. 
 
   Research has been conducted on how to strengthen 
cybersecurity controls in the use of MFS. (Public Key 
Infrastructure) PKI [3, 5] and biometry based authentication 
[4] have all been proposed to improve the strength of technical 
security controls for MFS products. Also, some work has been 
conducted on developing cybersecurity framework for 
complex systems. For instance, Carin, et al., [28] proposed an 
approach that was used to determine strategies and investment 
levels required for protecting intellectual property in complex 
systems. 
 
   In spite of the existence of these countermeasures, 
cybersecurity threats in the MFS STS have not abated. 
Existing countermeasures do not fully address these areas: 
 
• Privacy of user data; 
• Understanding the impact of human elements in 
cybersecurity of MFS STS; 
• Balance between usability and security in MFS; 
• Regulatory concerns in the complex MFS STS 
including cross border regulation; 
• Mobile forensic; 
• Information assurance within the complex MFS STS; 
• Understanding of requirement for building a resilient 
framework for cybersecurity for MFS STS; and  
• Enforcement of standards in the STS etc. 
 
 
   Consequently, there is a need for a resilient framework for 
tackling cyber-crime in the complex MFS STS.  
 
A Cybersecurity framework for Mobile Financial Services 
would help: 
• Put controls in place that would by dynamic and 
redundant to improve resilience; 
• Provide understanding of the Mobile Financial 
Services STS; 
• Provide understanding of information flow within the 
system; 
• Identify key stakeholders in the ecosystem and 
facilitate common understanding of challenges in the 
ecosystem; and 
•  Developed a cross-functional approach that would 
help mitigate the risk of cybercrime in the ecosystem. 
Such an artifact will: 
• Provide countermeasures with compensating controls 
that would facilitate high availability within the MFS 
STS; 
• Break the trust barrier within the ecosystem and 
improve trust in MFS; 
• Provide information assurance framework for MFS 
STS; and 
• Provide best practice case studies for adopting the 
information assurance framework. 
 
    In developing the framework, the unique characteristics of 
the human element and the social context of mobile device 
communication would be examined.  
 E. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED MFS-STS 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Existing countermeasures for mitigating cybercrime 
in complex systems work well in predefined environments. 
However, the element of social interaction and the existence 
of trusted and untrusted elements in complex STS make 
existing countermeasures unsuited for MFS STS.  The 
framework seeks to close the existing gap by taking into 
cognisance the dynamic social interactions within the STS and 
the existence of trusted and untrusted elements, to build 
controls that while mitigating undesirable actions by untrusted 
elements, is flexible enough to encourage desirable actions by 
trusted elements. 
  
The framework will analyse and provide an 
understanding of the risk(s) inherent in the process flows and 
components within the STS. It will then provide guidelines for 
putting in place appropriate control(s) to mitigate the risk(s). 
Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature of the risk(s) 
envisaged, guidelines for the adequate compensating controls   
to be deployed will be included in the framework. The 
controls will be flexible enough to adapt to changes in 
information flow and social interactions. 
 
The resilient nature of the framework is derived from 
the availability of compensating controls that can adapt to 
changes in the environment. 
  
  The next section describes the approach for developing the 
framework. 
 
 
 
III. APPROACH ADOPTED FOR  DEVELOPING 
SOLUTION 
 
   The MFS STS is an ill-defined problem space. Therefore, in 
coming up with an approach to develop a resilient framework 
for cybersecurity it was imperative to identify key 
stakeholders, analyse trusted and untrusted entities in the STS, 
understand flow of information and develop requirement for a 
resilient solution. 
 
   To achieve these, a 5 prong systematic approach was 
adopted that focused on defining the problem space before 
attempting to proffer solution. We describe the phases of the 
approach below. 
 
A. AS-IS ANALYSIS. 
 
    In this phase best practices and literatures would be 
examined with a view to understanding the current state of 
play as it regards MFS. Due to the importance of the human 
element in building resilient controls, literature on human 
factors approaches and how they can improve cybersecurity 
would also be investigated. Best practices in capability 
maturity would be investigated with a view to understanding 
the most effective approach to gathering requirements for 
developing a robust framework. Lastly, the nature of 
information flow within the system would be investigated; this 
would help in building controls that would improve 
information assurance within the system. The major outcome 
of this phase would be a better understanding of the state of 
play in MFS, cybersecurity issues in MFS, human factors 
approaches, capability maturity approaches and best practices 
in information assurance. 
 
 
B. REQUIREMENT 
 
   Requirement for building the cybersecurity framework 
would be developed in this phase based on the understanding 
of the MFS. Requirement management techniques like Use 
Case and MosCow would be used alongside human factor 
approaches like Soft System Methodology (SSM) and 
Interactive Management (IM) techniques to elicit requirement 
for developing the framework. Other methods for analysing 
complex systems as identified from the “As-Is” phase would 
also be applied to build the requirements as the need arises. 
 
C. FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
 
   Solution architecture and technology governance 
frameworks like The Open Group Architecture Framework 
(TOGAF) and Control OBjectives for Information and related 
Technology (COBIT) alongside proprietary information 
assurance frameworks would be used to build an integrated 
framework, based on the requirement gathered in the previous 
phase. 
 
D. TESTING 
 
   The developed framework would then be tested via focused 
group workshops and peer reviews. The workshops would 
seek to validate the framework. The framework would then be 
refined to reflect improvements. 
 
E. APPLICATION 
 
   The tested framework would be applied to the unbanked. 
Policies procedures and guidelines would be applied to 
address specific requirements for cybersecurity that would 
facilitate the uptake of MFS by the unbanked. 
 
 
Fig 2 shows the flow of activities for developing the 
framework. 
 
  The proposed approach was derived from best practices and  
review of relevant literatures. The approach would be refined 
as the need arises during the course of the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Flow of activities 
 
 
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF WORK 
UNDERTAKEN 
 
 
 This section highlights some preliminary findings based on 
the work done so far.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 One of the key findings of the literature review conducted 
was the importance of the human element in building a robust 
solution. Some of the existing technical countermeasures have 
not been effective due to the neglect of this important factor. 
Consequently, we investigated human elements and 
cybersecurity issues in the MFS STS. 
 
 
A. RESEARCH DESIGN FOR HUMAN ELEMENTS AND 
CYBERSECURITY ISSUES IN MFS STS 
 
The objective of this task was to analyse the human element 
and cybersecurity issues in the MFS STS from the perspective 
of the stakeholders in the STS, so as to gain better 
understanding of what it entails to develop controls and 
countermeasures that would be all-encompassing and easily 
applicable by the stakeholders.  
 
 
TABLE I.  JUSTIFICATION FOR HUMAN FACTOR APPROACHES USED. 
 
 
 
We adopted human factors approaches to achieve this 
objective. Human factors techniques have been known to help 
in defining ill-defined complex problem spaces similar to the 
MFS STS. For instance, Dogan et al., [37] used Human factors 
approaches to capture requirements for Knowledge 
Management research within the aerospace and defense 
industry.   
 
 Human factors techniques have also be used to guide the 
analyses of problems without early focus on solution. In a 
research conducted to understand the use of Human factors 
techniques in practice, it was discovered that most people use 
Human factors techniques to gain an understanding of a 
problem environment and to ease the understanding of 
problems [38].  
6 workshops were conducted for a total of 30 stakeholders; 
with each group consisting of 5 stakeholders. The 5 stakeholder 
groups comprised of the following: 
 
(i) Financial Services Regulators: This group was 
comprised of Deposit Money Banks and MFS 
regulators. 
(ii) Bank: Participants that made up this group were 
drawn from e-business units of Deposit Money 
Banks. 
(iii) Unbanked: All participants in this group had no form 
of bank account. 
(iv) Banked: All participants had formal bank accounts; 
some were user of MFS products. 
(v) Service Provider: The group consisted of technology 
service providers. 
(vi) CERT: This group was comprised of cybersecurity 
experts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of the workshops was to gain understanding of 
the human elements and cybersecurity issues from stakeholder 
perspective and how to mitigate them. 
To ensure effective participation, each workshop session 
started by a clarification of workshop objectives and a 
presentation on human factors approach and MFS. The 
procedure for the workshop was also described to participants. 
The tasks commenced by asking each group to come up with a 
rich picture depicting their understanding of the STS. Rich 
pictures are free sketches show interaction within the 
components of the system, including information flow [29]. 
They then built conceptual models representing their 
understanding of requirements for building cybersecurity in the 
STS. Rich picture and conceptual models are Soft System 
Methodology techniques. 
SN Approach Technique Justification 
1 Soft Systems Rich Picture Provided understanding of ill-defined problem space from stakeholder view point 
2 Root Definition 
and Conceptual 
Model 
Provided understand in on various stakeholder world views and key requirements for 
security concerns in the ecosystem 
3 Interactive 
Management 
 
Idea Writing Used to generate ideas by brain storming on human factor related cyber security 
challenges in the problem space. 
The technique helped in avoiding a situation where early focus would be on the solution 
before a proper understanding of the problems 
4 Nominal Group 
Technique 
Provided an understanding of key objectives of mitigating challenges identified. 
5 Interpretive 
Structural 
Modelling (ISM) 
Linked objectives to determine relationships and influences 
Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) developed by Peter 
Checkland is an action oriented approach for analysing ill-
defined problem spaces of complex systems [29].  Interactive 
Management (IM) techniques; Idea Writing (IW), Nominal 
Group Techniques (NGT) and Interpretive Structural 
Modelling (ISM), were used to generate issues and objectives 
for mitigating them, and how they influenced each other. 
Interactive Management techqnues are group decision making 
techniques suited for analysing complex environments [30].  
Table 1 provides justification for the approaches used. 
  
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted to validate the 
outcome of the research. Experts in the workshop had an 
average of 18 years in Information Technology and related 
disciplines, and had also participated in implementing 
information security programs for organisations. 
 
 
B. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
The understanding of the STS depends on the world view 
of the stakeholders. While the Bank is the ultimate regulator 
from the view point of the unbanked, the CERT group views 
international security enforcement agencies as stakeholders in 
the STS. Unknown stakeholders whose characteristics need to 
be understood exist in the ecosystem. To analyse the 
environment, we built the MFS STS.  Fig 3 below shows the 
consolidated SSM from all stakeholder groups depicting the 
STS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. MFS STS  (Banked: Bank accounts owners, Unbanked: No 
bank account, Principal: Mobile Money Operator, FS R= Financial 
Services Regulator CERT: Authorities responsible for cyber-incident 
management, POS: Point of Sale) 
 
 
 
The principal in the ecosystem that serves in the capacity 
of bank agents is responsible for user registration for MFS 
products. Special care needs to be taken by the principal when 
registering users as mistakes in user registrations can be 
exploited to perpetuate fraud. Agents might also have float; 
availability of physical or electronic money issues. They may 
not have enough money when customers need to cash-out. The 
proximity of agents to banks could also delay the restocking of 
cash, creating a gap for e-float supply. 
 
Banks do not operate beyond normal business hours, so do 
the principals. Hence, some functionality of MFS that requires 
input from the Bank, e.g. cash-in can only be accessed during 
normal banking hours. Other functionalities like money 
transfers and online payments can be achieved at any time of 
the day.  
 
Poor network connectivity in the use of MFS leads to poor 
customer experience which has further affected trust in the use 
of MFS products. The 2 key regulators in the ecosystem are 
the Financial Services (FS) regulator and the 
telecommunications (telco) regulators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FinTech
Unbanked Principal
Service
Provider FSR
CERT
Banked
POS
POS
Merchant
International
Boundaries
Telco Regulator
Telco
Unknown 
 
 The objectives of the regulators differ. While the FS 
regulator is concerned with the delivery of financial services, 
the telco regulator is primarily concerned with the quality of 
communication services. Collaboration between these 
regulators is essential, in order to effectively manage 
performance and ensure compliance within the STS.  
 
 
 
TABLE II.  TOP OBJECTIVES FOR MITIGATING CYBERSECURITY. 
 
 
 
 
 
The method of implementation of MFS varies. For 
instance, telcos are in the forefront of implementation of MFS 
in Kenya. FS regulator leads the implementation in some 
jurisdictions e.g. Nigeria. Payment services providers are also 
in the lead in some markets. The method of implementation of 
MFS in any jurisdiction has consequences for regulation and 
cybersecurity in the STS. 
 
38 out of the 269 issues generated were by the Deposit 
Money Bank (DMB) participants. The group viewed all issues 
impacting cybersecurity in the ecosystem in 4 broad categories 
that included awareness, infrastructure, process and others. 
Issues raised under others include, the rise in mobile malware 
and the threat of insider abuse. Trade-off between user 
experience and mobile application security was also identified 
as a threat impacting the STS. To encourage adoption, Mobile 
Money operators have implemented very minimal Know Your 
Customer (KYC) requirement. The regulator group fears this 
could be exploited for fraudulent purposes. The regulator 
group also expressed concern on the lack of skills of the 
regulators to develop and enforce standards for cybersecurity 
within the MFS STS. 
 
    Due to legal and regulatory differences between 
jurisdictions, it was noted that international money transfer 
capability using MFS might be an avenue for money 
laundering and terrorism financing. 
 
User awareness, either on technology, security or 
consumer protection process was an objective that recurred 
amongst all groups.  However, responsibility for user 
awareness was not clearly understood within the ecosystem. 
While some participants expect users to educate themselves, 
others expect the bank and service providers to be responsible 
for end-user education on cybersecurity.  
 
 Participants also observed that most providers of MFS 
products do not have dedicated help desk for cybersecurity. 
Cybersecurity concerns were treated like every other customer 
concerns. Furthermore, participants also observed that even 
when successfully reported incidences of cybercrime take a 
long time to be completely investigated, if they are ever 
concluded at all. Customers also noted that most of the 
investigations conducted end up with advicing users to be 
more security conscious in the use of the products. The lack of 
urgency in treating customer concerns relating to cyber fraud 
and the inability to satisfactorily close issues raised have 
further affected trust in the use of MFS. 
 
To address the issues raised, participants came up with a 
prioritised list of objectives. These objectives when applied in 
the opinion of the participants would mitigate the threat of 
cybercrime in the complex MFS STS. Table 2 shows the top 
12 objectives generated by all 6 groups. 
 
While the regulators saw implementing a cybersecurity 
operations centre as the most important objective for 
mitigating cybersecurity in the MFS STS, the banks view user 
awareness as the most important. The unbanked believed an 
improved understanding of the basic use of technology and 
cybersecurity threats would help mitigate against the threat of 
cybercrime. According to the unbanked, clarity of the process 
for escalating fraud issues was an important countermeasure 
cybercrime.  
 
The output of the ISM from the workshops showed that 
objective O1 was the most influential objective. Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs) were concerns about how to balance 
the need for implementing countermeasures and the 
availability of financial and material resources. 
 
Similar to when generating issues that affected 
cybersecurity in the complex MFS STS, perspectives of 
stakeholders and their understanding of cybersecurity 
requirements in the ecosystem also came into to play when 
ranking objectives for mitigating cybersecurity. 
 
In addition to an industry wide security operations centre, 
the regulators gave equal importance to ensuring that banks 
provide appropriate oversight to MFS agents and mitigating 
SN Objectives 
1 Setup an industry wide cybersecurity operations centre (O1) 
2 Mitigate risks associated with poor infrastructure (e.g. power, internet, 
technology) (O2) 
3 Implement robust awareness program on social engineering for users 
(O3) 
4 Enforce segregation of duty in Banks to minimize possibility of 
insider abuse(O4) 
5 Improve awareness on technology and information security(O5) 
6 Understand familiar phone hackers’ mode of operation(O6) 
7 Understand the security put in place for MFS to improve trust in the 
process(O7) 
8 Be open to change (O8) 
9 Revise current cybersecurity act with input from all key 
stakeholders(O9) 
10 Develop capacity building program on cybersecurity for all key 
players (O10) 
11 Ensure adequate investment in cybersecurity is imbedded in the 
strategy of service providers (O11) 
12 Ensure every service provider has a Business Continuity strategy 
(O12) 
the risk associated with poor infrastructure, which included 
sustainable energy supply and internet infrastructure. 
 
Providing a robust awareness program on social 
engineering along with segregation of duty to mitigate the 
risks of cybercrime and improving service availability were 
the main preoccupation of banks and their agents. 
 
The CERT group which was more interested in how to 
obtain and share intelligence was concerned about ensuring 
that legal frameworks for managing cybersecurity in the MFS 
were regularly updated to reflect changes in the ecosystem and 
the legal and regulatory environment as a whole. 
 
The CERT group recognised that there was no one-size-fit-
all solution to cybersecurity awareness and were interested in 
developing a cybersecurity awareness program specifically 
tailored to the needs of key stakeholders in the space. 
 
Generating and ranking objectives by participants in each 
group was based on NGT which had a voting process. 
However, consolidating all objectives from the groups was 
more challenging. By consensus, the participants agreed to 
consider the top 2 objectives in each group as the most 
important, after which the objectives were linked.  
 
The fig 4 shows the ISM result showing how the 12 listed 
top objectives for mitigating cybercrime in the MFS STS 
influence each other. 
 
It was observed that some objectives might impact on one 
or more of the other objectives. For instance, implementing a 
robust awareness program would facilitate improved security 
awareness for all key stakeholders. Updating cybersecurity 
regulations might require service providers to improve their 
Business Continuity capability. 
 
 
 
O1 
O9 
O11 O12 
O10 
O6 O8 
O3 O5 O7 
O2 O4 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 ISM model showing relationship between objectives 
 
 
 
Feedback obtained from the semi-structured interviews 
with SMEs included the following: 
 
(i) Financial intermediaries and settlement companies 
should be treated as separate stakeholders and not 
lumped under service providers as they play critical 
roles in MFS. 
(ii) To mitigate the risks affecting information flow 
within the ecosystem, it was suggested that 
technologies that manage partial commits due to 
infrastructure (Internet, power) failure should be 
implemented. 
(iii) To improve forensic investigation, implementation of 
software interfaces with forensic capabilities was 
recommended. 
(iv) Hardening of the user interface without 
compromising usability was also suggested. 
(v) In view of the huge cost consideration for 
implementing countermeasures. A shared services 
approach was recommended. 
(vi) To mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities with WI-FI, it 
was suggested that mobile applications with the 
capability to identify malicious WI-FI accesses 
should be deployed. 
 
(vii) It was also suggested that mobile applications should 
have the capability to disconnect automatically if the 
device is not appropriately patched and updated. 
(viii) Due to the vulnerability associated with human 
elements, it was suggested that banks should have a 
24/7 customer care centre to respond to cybercrime 
incidences. 
(ix) It was suggested that socio-cultural issues like myth 
and belief should be considered in coming up with a 
solution to mitigate the threat of cybercrime. 
(x) It was recommended that a legal framework which 
supports the unique operation of the MFS STS should 
be developed. 
   
 
Most of the feedback received from experts advocated 
strengthening of technical controls, improving user awareness 
and consideration for human factors and process workflow as 
a precursor for building a resilient cybersecurity 
countermeasure for the MFS STS. 
 
The feedback from the experts generally aligns with the 
issues raised in the IM workshops and the objectives 
recommended for mitigating cybersecurity issues in the 
complex MFS STS. 
 
 
 
 
 
V. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS 
 
 
Lack of trust has slowed down the adoption of MFS 
products in spite of its inherent benefits. Cybercrime was a 
major issue responsible for lack of trust in MFS.  Existing 
countermeasures for mitigating the threat of cybersecurity 
have not succeeded in reducing incidences of cybercrime and 
improving trust in the MFS.  
 
To have a better understanding of the benefits of 
MFS and the threat posed by cybercrime on its adoption, an 
in-depth analysis of MFS and the ecosystem it operates was 
conducted. The MFS STS is a complex ecosystem. In building 
a resilient framework for cybersecurity in the complex MFS 
STS, the complex nature of the STS and the nature of social 
interaction within the system, should be considered.   
 
The technology underpinning MFS facilitates the 
attainment of objectives of stakeholders in the MFS STS. 
However, vulnerabilities in the technology are exploited by 
untrusted elements in the STS to commit cybercrime. An 
analysis of the technological landscape provided more insight 
into these vulnerabilities and how they could be addressed.  
 
Existing countermeasures for mitigating the threat of 
cybercrime in MFS was examined. Though these 
countermeasures have enhanced the security of MFS, issues 
around data privacy, mobile forensic, information assurance 
and human elements still exist. 
 
A resilient cybersecurity framework as a control 
against cybersecurity threat in the MFS STS was proposed. 
The solution will be developed through a 5-pronged approach 
focusing on analysing the ill-defined problem space, 
understanding trusted and untrusted elements in the MFS STS, 
developing the requirement for building the framework and 
developing a framework based on solution architecture, IT 
governance and information assurance frameworks. 
 
Based on preliminary work conducted, an 
understanding of the stakeholders and components of the MFS 
STS and how components interact within the system were 
presented. We also identified unknown stakeholders that 
interact within the STS. Service providers were crucial as they 
could become a single point of failure within the STS. 
 
We generated 269 cybersecurity issues in the MFS 
STS using human factors approaches. We also identified 30 
objectives of how to mitigate these issues. We used the ISM 
technique to provide an understanding of the relationship and 
influences within identified objectives.   
 
Most of the feedbacks obtained from experts during 
the semi-structured interviews conducted, advocated 
strengthening of technical controls, improving user awareness 
and consideration for the human element and process 
workflow as a precursor to building a resilient cybersecurity 
countermeasure for the MFS STS. 
 
The need to further analyse the MFS STS with a view 
to understanding the trusted and untrusted elements was 
identified.  Also, the need to identify mobile applications with 
high level of uptake with the view to determining the usability 
patterns and usability aesthetics that facilitated their uptake 
was also identified. 
 
Future work would aim to investigate issues affecting 
trust in MFS in Mobile Social Networks (MSN) and how a 
trust model for the MFS STS would be applied to improve 
trust in the MSN. Usability and security characteristics of 
mobile applications with high uptake would also be examined, 
with a view to understanding characteristics and aesthetics of 
mobile applications that could be applied to MFS application 
to improve their uptake. 
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